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Church Affiliation and Life Course Transitions  
in The Netherlands, 1850-1970 
Jan Kok ∗ 
Abstract: »Kirchenzugehörigkeit und Lebensverlaufsmustertransition in den 
Niederlanden 1850-1970«. The Netherlands, with dozens of different religious 
denominations, offer a fine laboratory to study religious differentials in demo-
graphic behavior. In this article, I analyze a large historical database with more 
than 30.000 reconstructed life courses, to answer the question whether statis-
tically significant and consistent behavioral differences across life course do-
mains existed between members of different churches. For each domain – mar-
riage, co-residence, fertility and mortality – the question will be whether the 
specific ideology of the denominations accounts for the differences or whether 
the social milieu or life style of the members of these denomination are more 
important, even after controlling for socio-economic status. By charting demo-
graphic differentials across the life course, it becomes possible to detect 
whether different churches had specific “life scripts” or ideal scenarios accord-
ing to which their members should live their lives. 
Keywords: Religion, life course, historical demography, fertility, mortality, 
household, marriage, migration. 
1.  Introduction 
From their formation in the 16th century, the Netherlands have been the home 
of various, at times contending, religious groups. These groups were unevenly 
spread across the country and were quite unequal in terms of political rights 
and social characteristics. During the 19th century, the socio-economic differ-
ences between the denominations were moderated. But interestingly, their 
behavioral differences increased in the late 19th century, at least with respect to 
sexuality and family formation (Shepherd et al. 2006). This development has 
been ascribed to the phenomenon of ‘pillarization.’ In the final quarter of the 
19th century, the political mobilization of Roman Catholics and neo-Calvinists 
ushered into a realignment of society along ideological lines. Catholics, 
Protestants, Liberals and Socialists were engaged in fierce competition and 
were keen on strengthening group identity in which their own notions on fami-
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ly values and moral purity played an important role. Due to their remarkable 
compliance with ethical prescriptions, the Dutch gained the nickname of the 
“moral nation” of Europe. This “morality” was particularly apparent in a slow 
adoption of modern birth control.  
Although many studies have dealt with the Dutch fertility decline, demogra-
phers are still debating the relative weight of religious versus socio-economic 
or regional factors (Van Heek 1954, 1956; Buissink 1971; Hofstee 1981; Van 
Poppel 1985; Engelen and Hillebrand 1986; Van Bavel and Kok 2004; 
Schoonheim 2005; Janssens 2014). For several reasons this problem proves 
hard to solve. First, information on fertility was – until recently – only availa-
ble at the aggregate level of municipalities, which impeded conclusions about 
causation at the individual level. Second, many participants of the debate em-
ployed simple categorizations of denominations (e.g. “Catholic,” “Protestant,” 
“others”) that obscured instead of elucidated religious differentials. Finally, we 
still know little about differences in behavior between religious groups before 
the onset of Pillarization and the fertility decline. 
Whereas religious differentials in fertility have been relatively well-studied, 
we know little about the effect of religion in other domains of the life course, 
such as marriage, co-residence or health. Even more important, we don’t know 
to what extent the differentials in all these field combine to form coherent 
patterns, let alone how to interpret this. This article aims to explore religious 
differentials in a large number of transitions across different domains of the life 
course, in order to see whether a consistent pattern emerges and to suggest 
explanations for such a pattern. For this effort, I draw on previous work, as 
well as on recalculations using data from the Historical Sample of the Nether-
lands (HSN). This database stores all information on the life course of 40.000 
randomly selected individuals (born between 1863 and 1922). For several 
regions, detailed information is available for earlier birth cohorts (1822-1862). 
The information includes (changes of) religion, occupation, family situation, 
co-residence, migration and death (Mandemakers 2006). Thus, the HSN mate-
rial provides an excellent opportunity to identify to what extent life courses 
differed by denomination. In fact, dozens of different religious groups are 
represented in the database. However, the information on religion poses two 
problems for our purposes. First, the largest single Church, the Dutch Re-
formed Church, was an amalgam of widely divergent groups ranging from 
ultra-orthodox to ultra-liberal, making it very difficult to interpret its demo-
graphic outcomes. Second, many groups are too small to be meaningfully in-
cluded in statistical analysis. In the third section, I propose a solution to deal 
with these problems. In the fourth section, I will summarize the results from 
twenty multivariate regressions on life course transitions. Subsequently, I ex-
plore in more detail how these results could be interpreted and how they relate 
to findings by other scholars. In the concluding discussion, I try to answer the 
question whether particular religious ideologies and social control mechanisms 
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amounted to church members following consistent ‘life scripts,’ or scenarios of 
how their life courses should look like (Boonstra, Bras and Derks 2014; Jansen 
and Rubin 2010). First, however, I will give a brief overview of theories on 
religious differentials in demography. 
2.  Religion and Demography 
Individual demographic behavior is the outcome of complex processes operat-
ing at the local and familial level and determined by economic opportunities, 
local conventions, family strategies and individual aspirations of social better-
ment. What role, if any, does religion play in this complex? Historical demog-
raphy and the sociology of religion offer a wide range of hypotheses on the 
conditions and circumstances explaining why religious affiliation sometimes 
has strong effects on behavior, and sometimes not at all. Following others (e.g. 
Goldscheider 1971, 1999; Baudin 2015), I cluster these hypotheses in a number 
of broad categories of hypotheses related to: 1) the impact of the Churches’ pre-
scriptions and control mechanisms; 2) the nature of religious communities; 3) the 
socio-economic positions of Church members and 4) local environmental factors. 
I will then discuss the problem of studying affiliation rather than religiosity. 
1) Religious prescriptions and social control. In his seminal article, Kevin 
McQuillan (2004) suggested that there are three necessary conditions pertain-
ing to religious ideology, church organization, and members’ identification 
with the clergy, for religion to have an effect on fertility. He states that, first, 
the religion must articulate values and norms that somehow, directly or indi-
rectly, manifestly or latently, affect any of the proximate determinants of fer-
tility; second, that it must possess the means to communicate these norms to its 
members and to enforce compliance; and third, that members must feel a sense 
of attachment to their religious community. According to McQuillan, none of 
these conditions is sufficient on its own, while the stronger they all apply, the 
stronger the expected impact on fertility is. Indeed, his framework neatly ex-
plains why the pronatalist prescriptions of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
late nineteenth century coupled with modern mass-organizations and forms of 
propaganda led to such remarkable effects in countries such as Quebec, Ireland 
and The Netherlands, countries where Roman Catholics strongly identified 
with the clergy who were simultaneously leading a political emancipation 
movement. McQuillan’s framework for religious effects on fertility stimulates 
the researcher to look for combinations of prescriptions, means of dissemina-
tion, effective sanctions, and lay identification with the clergy. Norms on fertil-
ity can range from the sacredness of life implying that births should not be 
prevented to ideas on paternal responsibility implying that responsible fathers 
should adjust family size to income (Praz 2009). Means of dissemination range 
from sermons, catechism (examinations) to periodicals, and, as in the Dutch 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  62 
case, even to confessional schools, journals, trade unions and universities. 
Sanctions can be diverse as well, and include penitence (after the confession), 
withholding of poor relief, barring from the Eucharist, and expelling from the 
congregation. But all these do not work without identification of people with 
their church leaders, or the conviction that the church and clergy serve their 
best interests. In the Netherlands of the late nineteenth century, this conviction 
was strong among the Roman Catholics and the neo-Calvinist secessionists 
from the mainstream Dutch Reformed Church, but it was already weak in other 
segments of the population, especially among the lower classes still nominally 
members of the numerically dominant Dutch Reformed Church.  
Is McQuillan’s framework also applicable to other life course domains than 
sexuality and fertility? The domain of marriage probably fits the framework 
rather neatly. Roman Catholicism valuates marriage differently than Protestant-
ism as its sacramental status implies that it cannot be dissolved. Moreover, 
Roman Catholics valuated celibate alternatives to marriage higher than 
Protestants. When it comes to the domains of households and health, however, 
we can expect less direct religious prescriptions and norm. Most religions em-
phasize the importance of family relations, and strong differences between 
Protestant, Catholic and Jewish denominations are not very likely. The latter 
are known for the detailed rules for proper nutrition and hygiene, which is often 
reflected in mortality differentials (e.g. Derosas 2003, also below).  
The described framework of norms-sanctions-identification does not deal 
extensively with internal family processes as they are affected by religious 
adherence (Dollahite and Marks 2009). An example is the impact of religion on 
marriage. Strongly religious persons will perceive their marital bond as willed 
and/or sanctioned by God, thus superseding to a point individual desires and 
frustrations. Because of their beliefs such persons will avoid adultery and will 
experience more feelings of guilt and rejection by their community in case of 
divorce. Apart from these effects of internalization and sanctions, religious 
practices at home may lead to more marital stability. An example are de-
escalating effects of joint prayer in case of marital discord (Mahoney et al. 
2008). From a Beckerian micro-economic perspective, when both partners 
share the same religion committing them to marriage and family life, this leads 
to more “efficient households”. Thus, religiously mixed marriages are expected 
to end more often in divorce (Lehrer 2004, 707-8). However, finding a partner 
from the same church involves a cost-benefit calculation depending on one’s 
adherence to the church in the first place, the waiting time, the marriage market 
et cetera (Lehrer 2004, 710). 
2) Religious communities. Church members’ demographic behaviour can be 
affected – even apart from the specific beliefs and moral prescriptions – by 
their belonging to a specific community. Their involvement may ease their 
integration in a local community, which can be of specific importance to mi-
grants. The community can offer them social support, sociability, and counsel-
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ling which can have a positive impact on marriage stability, child care and 
health. But negative effects are also possible; for instance when a community 
isolates itself from the “hostile” outside world and rejects scientific approaches 
to health problems. Thus, it has been shown that American communities prac-
tising faith healing have higher levels of infant and child mortality (Bartkowski 
et al. 2011).  
When a religious community forms a minority in the local community at 
large, this can lead to specific outcomes. Minority groups tend to rely strongly 
on (kin) networks for their survival and reproduction. Not only does this lead to 
a strong emphasis on family bonds, the nature of the ties to kin is also of im-
portance. If these ties are “weak”, that is the network is socially and geograph-
ically heterogeneous, members may benefit from new ideas and opportunities 
dispersed through the network. The “modern” demographic behaviour of Jew-
ish minorities (e.g. as forerunners in the fertility decline) has sometimes been 
ascribed to this network effect (see literature overview in Van Poppel and 
Schoonheim 2005). Again, the opposite effect can be expected from “strong 
ties”, or a “closed” minority group consisting of members living in one locality 
and doing the same kind of work. An example are the small Orthodox 
Protestant groups found in agricultural or fishing villages across the Nether-
lands. 
3) Characteristics. When churches consist disproportionately of specific so-
cio-economic groups, the observed demographic differences may not be caused 
by religious creeds or the effects of belonging to a community, but simply by 
income, housing, or work (e.g. Ó Gráda 2008). In historical research, the op-
portunities to control for this are rather limited. Normally, one controls for 
occupational status, but this does not capture all socio-economic differentials. 
Moreover, socio-economic status of children, married women and the elderly 
have to be deduced from, respectively, their fathers, their husbands and them-
selves in an earlier stage in their life course. In the analyses summarized in this 
article, socio-economic status is included in the multivariate regression models, 
but we should remain aware of unobserved characteristics. For instance, the 
(Liberal) Protestant denomination of Remonstrants were rather strongly domi-
nated by urban elites, which is not completed captured by their occupations. 
4) Environment. The influence of religion on demographic outcomes, even 
if measured at the individual level, need not always or only have to run through 
individual beliefs and practices. For instance, the presence of a particular 
Church can have influenced the health “infrastructure” of a locality or region. 
Family doctors may be wary of setting up practice in a region known to be 
adverse to modern medicine. Thus, multilevel models, in which local presence 
of medical facilities are incorporated, would be ideal to study how mortality 
risks are affected by religion (Reid and Van den Boomen 2015, 314). In this 
study, we cannot avoid the risk of ‘atomic fallacy’ (Courgeau 2002), as only 
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rather superficial controls for local contextual factors (e.g. urban versus rural 
locality) can be included. 
Historical sources, even as fine-grained as the Dutch ones, rarely allow for 
testing whether Church members are actually church goers, let alone whether 
they are deeply religious or not. Although, on principle, adding variables on 
religiousness is not impossible (e.g. by looking at Biblical name-giving, avoid-
ance of conception and marriage during Lent and Advent, paying church con-
tributions, and weddings in church) it is not feasible for the database at large. 
Although most scholars discussing possible effects from religion on demo-
graphic behaviour presuppose a certain level of religiousness, we can only 
work with the difference in (officially registered) Church affiliation. To some 
extent, however, affiliation does offer a clue to religiousness. First, we can 
expect that members of recently seceded Churches – quite a few on the Ortho-
dox Protestant flank – were more actively involved in religious activities than 
members of traditional churches. Second, we expect that people who declared 
their religion as ‘none’ can be contrasted safely to Church members when it 
comes to religiosity. Finally, persons who married someone from another 
Church or someone without religion were less likely to be strongly involved in 
religious practices and beliefs than others. During the heyday of pillarization 
(1935-1955) the intensity of mixed marriages was the lowest in Dutch history. 
For instance, in 1947 only about five per cent of Catholics had a mixed first 
marriage (Hondius 2001, 59). Mixed marriages have often been associated with 
a low level of religiosity by contemporaries (Sanders 1931; Kruijt 1933). Ac-
cording to some authors, the indifference to religious prescriptions can explain 
the remarkably low marital fertility of mixed couples (Van Leeuwen 1959). 
In the next section, we discuss the (perhaps bewildering) variety of denomi-
nations in The Netherlands and propose a simple classification, which can be 
used for statistical analysis. The classification is based on the first set of hy-
pothesis, or the nexus of dogmas and beliefs, institutional means of dissemina-
tion and control, and identification. We control as much as possible for socio-
economic characteristics. However, we cannot study properly the socio-
psychological effects of participation in a church community, the effects of the 
differential composition of networks, the impact of religiosity, nor the indirect 
effects of living in a region dominated by a specific denomination.  
3.  Religious Denominations in The Netherlands  
Already since the sixteenth century, The Netherlands are home to several reli-
gious denominations, including the Jewish. Calvinism was the official creed, 
and state officials had to be members of the Dutch Reformed Church. In disci-
plining the populace, church ministers and law enforcers worked closely to-
gether. However, minority religions were almost always condoned, since the 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  65 
government recognized the benefits of religious tolerance for commerce and 
prosperity. In 1815, the Netherlands became a unified Kingdom, with the 
Dutch Reformed Church as the official Church, although members of all reli-
gions were now given equal rights. In the early half of the nineteenth century, 
reaction against modern Enlightenment ideas and “revolutionary” restructuring 
of power relations within families and within society intensified. Orthodox 
religions were rapidly gaining strength and societal impact in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. The combative spirit of the Catholic minority was 
fueled by their emancipation to full civil rights and in particular by the restora-
tion of the clerical hierarchy (1853). From the 1850s onwards, the number of 
specific Catholic associations and institutions, such as schools, increased rapid-
ly. On the Protestant side, the Orthodox were similarly building their own 
organizations. In the decades to follow, both groups intensified their efforts to 
improve national morality through education, poor relief and lay organizations 
(Righart 1988). 
The competition between Catholic, Orthodox and more liberal groups was 
intense. From the 1880’s onwards, Dutch society gradually became “pillar-
ized”. Pillarization means compartmentalization on an ideological basis: the 
pillars strove toward autarky by providing their members with all possible 
services, from cradle to grave: unions, insurance, banking, mass media, 
schools, hospitals, old people’s homes, youth and adult movements, and even 
political parties. The essential elements in the building of group identity among 
the Orthodox Protestants and Catholics were family values and sexual purity.  
I expect denominational differences to be reflected in behavioral differences 
if the three preconditions described by McQuillan (see above) are met. Thus, 
the denomination needs to have specific values and norms with respect to fami-
ly relations, health, sexuality or procreation, it needs to have effective means of 
communication and sanctions, and the Church members need to identify with 
their clergy. I will give a brief overview of Dutch denominations from the 
perspective of this framework, based on earlier work by Kok and Van Bavel 
(2006). 
In the seventeenth century, the leading Dutch Reformed Church advocated a 
rather strict interpretation of the Bible and professed a strong belief in predesti-
nation. The Protestant view on marriage was different from the Catholic one: 
Protestantism emphasized mutual support between the spouses, whereas in 
Catholicism, the prime function of marriage was procreation (Van Poppel 
1985; McQuillan 1999). In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
leading circles were influenced by Enlightenment ideas; “modernist” theology 
tried to reconcile scientific insights and rationality with religion. Literal inter-
pretation of the Bible, predestination, and the Resurrection of Christ were dis-
carded and replaced by an optimistic belief in human reason, that was seen as a 
manifestation of divinity (Cossee 2001). In the late nineteenth century, the 
“modernists” organized themselves in associations of Vrijzinnig Hervormden 
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(Liberal Reformed). In 1920, almost thirty per cent of the Dutch Reformed 
ministers were Liberal (Knippenberg 1992, 109). Somewhat less radical was 
the group of the “Ethicals.” Although receptive to new scientific insights, the 
Ethicals did not reject the authority of the Bible. In 1920, 28.4 per cent of the 
ministers was affiliated with this group. The Liberal Reformed, and to a lesser 
extent the Ethicals, were inclined to grant the individual a large degree of au-
tonomy in matters of family planning. In other words, the necessary “ideologi-
cal” precondition for a religious effect on demography is not valid in their case. 
Not surprisingly, the advance of rationalist theology met with increasing re-
sistance from conservative elements in the Dutch Reformed Church. Led by 
discontented rural elites, secessions of Orthodox ministers and their followers 
took place in 1834 and in 1886. In 1892 these groups merged in the Reformed 
Church (Gereformeerde Kerk), but a remainder of the 1834 group continued as 
the Christian Reformed Church. Both churches were very clear in their doctri-
nal message: sexuality could only take place within marriage and only with the 
aim of procreation. This message was conveyed through youth organizations, 
journals and periodicals. By 1900, both Orthodox Protestant Churches account-
ed for 13.6 per cent of Dutch Protestantism (Knippenberg 1992, 97). 
However, there were many more Orthodox Protestants. A large Orthodox 
segment of the Dutch Reformed Church had chosen to remain within this 
church, which they saw as Gods own “planting” in The Netherlands. They 
could maintain this position because of the very loose structure of the official 
church. Although the Dutch Reformed Church had a set of doctrines (such as 
the Heidelberg Catechism), church discipline in doctrinal matters had been 
abandoned. In fact, restoration of this discipline was the main bone of conten-
tion during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Dutch Reformed Church 
was highly democratic. Church members elected the deacons and elders who 
formed the church council. The council in its turn called a minister to the parish 
whose preaching was expected to match the convictions of the parish’ majority. 
In other words, Orthodox congregations within the Dutch Reformed Church 
could go on very much as they liked. During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, they formed associations of their own. From 1864 onwards the Con-
fessionele Vereeniging (Confessionals) aimed at restoring doctrinal discipline. 
From their circle, an ultra-Orthodox group split off in 1895. This fundamental-
ist Gereformeerde Bond (Unionists) was to become the strongest bulwark of 
Orthodoxy in the twentieth century. Their communities were characterized by a 
strong geographic and mental isolation; leaving the village was discouraged, 
newcomers were mistrusted and scientifically based innovations such as inocu-
lation and chemical fertilizers were often rejected (Zwemer 1992). In 1920, 
both groups accommodated 48 per cent of the Dutch Reformed. 
Finally, a number of smaller Protestant groups deserve attention. The Ana-
baptist Mennonites had their roots in the Radical Reformation of the sixteenth 
century. Although consisting of very diverse sub-branches, the Mennonite 
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Brotherhood was generally characterized by anti-authoritarianism, rationalism 
and a large emphasis on individual autonomy. Already in the eighteenth centu-
ry, their growth was hampered by very low marital fertility (Knippenberg 1992, 
53). The Mennonites were also highly receptive to new scientific insights. In 
1800, two Mennonite ministers initiated the campaign against smallpox by 
having their own children inoculated (Rutten 1997, 237-8). Even more liberal 
were the Remonstrants, who had seceded from the Dutch Reformed Church 
already in 1619 because they could not accept the doctrine that predestination 
overruled individual belief. In subsequent centuries, this groups of dissenters 
formed a haven for Liberal Protestants from other churches. Mennonites and 
Remonstrants were also quite progressive in allocating responsible roles to 
women. For instance, the Mennonites had female deacons in charge of poor 
relief. In addition, these churches were the first to allow women to become 
priests (in 1905), on condition that they were not married. Lastly, the Lutheran 
Church, strongly associated with German and Scandinavian immigrants and 
their descendants, was by and large moderate in its doctrines, apart from a very 
small Orthodox secessionist group. 
Among the Jews, the spread of modern interpretations of religion and the 
loosening of moral prescriptions remained by and large limited to a small elite 
and the majority of the Jews remained orthodox (Knippenberg 1992, 196, 199). 
As far as the Churches held doctrines or values concerning demographic be-
havior, it is relevant to know whether they also had the means to communicate 
their messages to their followers and, if necessary, to sanction unruly members. 
The Roman Catholics had an extensive array of institutions at their disposal. 
Their message was brought home through periodicals, schools and lay organi-
zations. Even more impact had the system of confessions and absolution of 
sins. The Gereformeerden were probably even more successful in organizing 
their supporters and forging a sense of corporate identity. Their leader Abra-
ham Kuyper, who created his own newspaper, political party and university, is 
considered the first modern mass-politician in Dutch history (Van Rooden 
2002). In the Gereformeerde Churches, traditional systems of moral control 
were revived. Disciplinary measures ranged from admonition, prohibition to 
join the Lord’s Supper, to public confession of sins and expulsion from the 
congregation. In the Dutch Reformed Church these measures had already be-
come obsolete in the first half of the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Lutheran 
Church was lenient in matters of morality (Kemkes-Grottenthaler 2003, 718).  
The Orthodox groups within the Dutch Reformed Church lacked the organi-
zational drive of the secessionist Orthodox (Van Rooden 1996). In addition, 
they were remarkably ineffective in terms of moral discipline. This has every-
thing to do with their pietistic views on salvation. Redemption is granted by 
divine grace, not earned by one’s own belief or pious acts. Only a person him-
self knows whether he or she is redeemed and only then will he or she take part 
in the Lord’s Supper. Thus, “avoidance” of communion is widespread in these 
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circles. On the one hand, this belief requires a constant inspection of the state 
of one’s soul. On the other hand, there is an overpowering emphasis on the 
sinfulness of the “world” and the “flesh.” This situation appears to result in an 
ethical vacuum: there are no clear behavioral rules and no clear control mecha-
nisms, either from the side of the parents or from the Church (Miedema 1989).  
Until the Batavian-French period (1795-1813) the Jewish “nation” had been 
allowed to rule itself, which in practice mean strong control of their local digni-
taries on religious practices and moral discipline. Emancipation meant the 
weakening of internal control mechanisms. From the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century onward and in contrast to the Orthodox Protestant and Roman 
Catholic minorities, the Jews did not form their own “pillar” with strong civic 
associations and political clubs but began to assimilate strongly (Knippenberg 
1992, 198).  
Both in terms of ideology and institutional practices, Dutch denominations 
display a bewildering variety. For the sake of simplicity, we place the major 
Protestant groupings as well as the other religions into a scheme based on 
McQuillan’s first two criteria: the presence of doctrines or values stimulating 
high fertility and the presence of institutional means to communicate these 
(Table 1). There is a clear distinction between groups with no or moderate 
doctrines regarding procreation and groups with outspoken doctrines and val-
ues. Along more or less the same line, the religious groups are divided by the 
strength of the organizations and control mechanisms. 
Table 1: Main Dutch Religious Groups by Ideology and Institutions 
Strength of  
institutions 
Importance of values and norms regarding family, sexuality  
and marriage 
 Low Moderate High 
Low Mennonites 
Remonstrants 
Dutch Reformed 
(Liberals) 
Dutch Reformed 
(Ethicals) 
Lutherans 
 
Moderate   Dutch Reformed  
(Confessionals) 
Dutch Reformed (Unionists) 
Jews 
High   Christian Reformed (1834) 
Reformed (Gereformeerd) 
(1892) 
Roman Catholics 
Based on Kok and Van Bavel 2006, 91. See also Appendix 1. 
 
According to McQuillan (2004), for religion to have an impact on demographic 
behavior a third condition is necessary: individual believers need to identify 
with their church. In the period between roughly 1880 and 1960, the level of 
identification of most Christians with their Church was extremely high and, in 
fact, unprecedented. Developments in this period have been described in terms 
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of a cultural class-formation. The Gereformeerde leader Kuyper was not only 
successful in mobilizing and organizing the revolt of commoners against the 
Enlightened elites, his discourse came to be accepted by other groups as well. 
He claimed that the Dutch people had always consisted of three groups: Liber-
als, Orthodox Protestants and Catholics. In his view, the dominance of the 
liberals was unjustified and all groups should be free to run their own affairs. 
Indeed, the success of Protestant and Catholic political parties ensured that this 
vision was realized: state subsidies were directed to private confessional 
schools as well as to confessional broadcasting corporations. Dutch “pillariza-
tion” goes beyond McQuillan’s notion of the coincidence of religion and na-
tionalism. The identity of the “imagined communities” of religious groups 
superseded national identity. The attachment was strongest among the Roman 
Catholics and the Gereformeerden. For example, in the early 1960’s 90 per cent 
of their members attended church several Sundays per month. Although reli-
gious (group) identification may have been strong, this still leaves us with the 
question of religiosity: to what extent did people really participate in Church 
activity and religious practices. As we stated in the previous section, we can 
only approach this issue indirectly. 
A more specific problem of research on demographic differentials between 
religious groups is that the single largest Church in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
Reformed (54,5 per cent of the population in 1879) tends to be described as an 
“intermediate” group with “moderate” behavior. In my opinion, this is a statis-
tical artifact due to the researchers’ incapability to make a distinction between 
the subdivisions within the Dutch Reformed Church which I have just de-
scribed. Instead of being “moderate,” this Church actually consisted of very 
outspoken Liberal and Orthodox streams. Unfortunately, is not possible to 
detect membership of these groups on the basis of the population registers. 
However, the religious orientation of the Church ministers is known for the 
year 1920. Since communities chose their own ministers, it can be assumed that 
fully orthodox communities were already Orthodox in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. We assume Dutch Reformed persons to be of Orthodox persuasion if they 
were born in a locality where all ministers adhered to one of the Orthodox 
organizations. Obviously, this remains an unsatisfactory proxy, as individuals 
need not identify with their community’s predominant orientation, but so far it 
is the best solution at hand. 
For analytical purposes, I divide for the remainder of this paper the 
Protestants in two groups: Liberal Protestants (Mennonites, Remonstrants, 
Liberal Reformed, Ethical Reformed and Lutherans) and Orthodox Protestants 
(Confessional Reformed, Unionist Reformed, Christian Reformed and Re-
formed (Gereformeerd). Some small denominations could not be classified as 
“Liberal” or “Orthodox’ and are mostly relegated to a category “other denomi-
nations.” An example is the Old Catholic Church, which seceded from the 
Roman Catholic Church in the early eighteenth century in resistance to the 
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centralist organization of the mother church. In Appendix I, a more complete 
overview is given of the denominations found in the Dutch population admin-
istration in the period 1850-1970, and of how these are classified. 
4.  Overview of the Effects of Religion on Demographic 
Behavior 
This article draws on a number of earlier studies on life course transitions, 
based on (parts of) the Historical Sample of the Netherlands. This database 
compiles life course data as completely as possible for a representative portion 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century population (Mandemakers 2006). The 
sample is drawn from the birth certificates from the period 1812-1922 
(n=78,000). Most of the data for the reconstruction of life courses, however, are 
extracted from the population registers. The Netherlands is one of the few 
countries in the world that has kept a continuous population register starting in 
the mid-nineteenth century. In 1940, the system was replaced by personal 
cards, which makes it more difficult to reconstruct households. In the popula-
tion registers, date and place of birth, relation to the head of the household, sex, 
marital status, occupation, and religion were recorded for each individual. Also, 
all changes occurring in the household were recorded in the register. These 
changes were usually made at least within a month of occurrence of an event.  
Most of the studies summarized here cover the period between 1850 and 
1940, as the information on life courses are optimal in this period. In these 
studies, several life course transitions have been analysed, mostly using reli-
gion only as a control factor. In this article, I focus on the actual strength of 
religious differentials in various transitions across the life course. Each transi-
tion has been studied with a multivariate regression model controlling for pos-
sible confounders. For instance, in studying birth spacing we have controlled 
for age of the mother, marriage duration, children ever born, number of chil-
dren alive, death of the previous child, socio-economic status, and religion 
(Van Bavel and Kok 2010b). I have made sure that all regression models con-
trol at least for type of locality and socio-economic status, in order to account 
as much as possible for the effect of “characteristics.” For instance, Jews are 
portrayed as “forerunners” in the demographic transition with lower levels of 
marital fertility than religious groups. This has been explained from their con-
centration in urban localities and in specific occupations (Knippenberg 1992, 
201). By controlling for urban-rural differences and socio-economic status, we 
are better able to observe the possible impact of ideologies, lifestyle or net-
works. Another reason to control for rural-urban differences is that, generally, 
religious adherence was weaker in cities, as noted in contemporary studies. 
Kruijt (1933) listed several reasons for this phenomenon. In the countryside, 
church attendance was often part of communal traditions (in several villages 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  71 
people went in procession to church) and embedded in intense social control. The 
more isolated the villages were, the longer this could continue. Migrants to cities 
often felt not “at home” in church and would cease going altogether. Cities were 
also places where people with divergent backgrounds and beliefs intermingled. 
To avoid conflicts, one tended to evade the topic of religion in social encounters. 
Finally, the apparatus of the Church had not kept pace with the growth of the 
cities (Schoonheim 2005, 101). For ministers and elders in large cities it was 
impossible to make personal acquaintance with all the members. In addition, 
people were often “lost” to Church supervision due to frequent removals. 
I have chosen not to present twenty different tables with extended model 
outcomes, but, instead, to harmonize and to simplify the outcomes in two ways. 
First, I have rephrased the potential differences in demographic behavior be-
tween the denominations in the form of differences in relation to Liberal 
Protestants. A comparison with non-denominationals as the statistical reference 
category might have been of more theoretical interest, but they form a rather 
small group (only 2,3% in 1899) in the period under consideration and were 
also strongly associated with Socialist anticlericalism (Knippenberg 1992, 
229). Using the same reference category implied I sometimes had to redo the 
original calculations. Second, I only show whether a particular behavior was 
more (indicated with a +) or less (indicated with a -) likely than among the 
Liberal Protestants. When the sign is given in parentheses this means the result 
was not statistically significant. When no sign is given this means that the 
model did not include a specific group. I also leave out the outcomes for “oth-
er” religions and cases with “religion unknown” as they are not of theoretical 
interest. When possible, I look for gender differences. Life course transitions 
(such as getting married or not) can have different implications for men and 
women. But also, the religions can vary in their appreciation of male and female 
statuses and roles. Finally, religiosity can differ strongly between men and wom-
en. When no distinction in sex was made in the analysis, the results are listed 
under M. 
Table 2 presents the results of this exercise. Overall, we observe that in all 
demographic domains, religious affiliation had a remarkable effect on behav-
ior, even after controlling for urban-rural and socio-economic differences. 
Especially the Roman Catholics differed from the Liberal Protestants in almost 
all life course domains. The only exceptions are the household situation of 
adolescents (see next section for more discussion) and infant and child mortali-
ty, in which they do not differ statistically significant from the Liberal 
Protestants. The Orthodox Protestants are in some respects more similar to the 
Liberal Protestants than the Catholics, as we can see from the non-significant 
scores on leaving home, celibacy, divorce, childlessness and the incidence of 
one-children families. And Orthodox Protestant women were actually more 
often pregnant at marriage than Liberal Protestant women. The Jews appear as 
more family-minded (although not in all respects), but also more traditional in 
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terms of marriage than Liberal Protestants, judging from lower levels of bridal 
pregnancy and later marriage. They were not inclined to celibacy. In terms of 
birth control the Jews do not differ strongly from the Liberal Protestants, and – 
as expected – they experienced lower risks of infant mortality. People without 
(official) religion do not stand out in relation to Liberal Protestants, except for a 
lower likelihood of young widowers of living with kin, and a higher likelihood 
of young widows. Religiously mixed couples were not often included in the 
regression models here.1  
Table 2.1: Outcomes of Hypothesized Differences in Demographic Behavior of 
Denominations in Relation to Liberal Protestants (Part 1) 
 Period Region N OrthodoxProtestants
Roman 
Catholics Jews None 
Hypothesis    M F M F M F M F 
Household 
Adolescents staying 
with parents [ii] 
1860-
1940 rural 7579 (-) (+) (+) (-)   (+) (-) 
Living with kin:  
At age 18 [iii] 1860-1940 all 15697 (-) (+) (-) (-) + (+) (+) (-) 
As illegitimate 
child [iv] 
1863-
1902 all 848 +  +  -  (+)  
As orphan age 10 
[v] 
1873-
1902 all 92 +  +  (+)  (-)  
As celibate age 40 
[vi] 
1890-
1922 all 802 + + + + + + - + 
As widow(er) age 
70 [vii] 
1920-
1940 all 422 +  +  +  (+)  
Sexuality and marriage 
Pregnancy before 
marriage [viii] 
1870-
1940 all 9893 (+) + - - - (-) (-) (+) 
Late marriage [ix] 1860-1970 all 15697 + + + + + (+) (+) (-) 
Celibacy [x] 1860-1970 all 15697 (-) (+) + + (-) (+) (+) (+) 
Divorce [xi] 1870 all 13435 (-) (-) - - (+) (+) (-) (+) 
[ii] Only children of farmers and agricultural workers living in the countryside. Based on da-
taset presented in Mönkediek, Kok and Mandemakers (2015). 
[iii] Defined as not living in households headed by a parent, but as kin in other households. 
Recalculation of dataset in Kok 2014. 
[iv-v] Recalculation of database described in Kok and Mandemakers 2012. 
[vi] Ibid, includes (still) living with parents(s). 
[vii] Ibid. Dependent variable defined as living with siblings and/or children and /or other kin.  
                                                             
1  [i] For mixed couples all outcomes would be neutral, except  
- marriage, both genders 1870-1940 all regions: (-) 
- divorce, both genders 1870-1940 all regions: (-)  
- childlessness, both genders, 1919-1950 all regions:  + 
- stopping, both genders, 1890-1940 West-Central region:  – . 
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[viii] Recalculation of the dataset described in Kok 2011. 
[ix] Model based on life courses of persons who survived at least until age 50. Late marriage 
defined as marriage between age 28 (women) or age 30 (men) and death. Based on Kok 2014. 
[x] Based on Kok 2014. 
[xi] Calculation with dataset described in Kok 2011, including infertile couples. 
Table 2.2: Outcomes of Hypothesized Differences in Demographic Behavior of 
Denominations in Relation to Liberal Protestants (Part 2)  
 Period Region N Orthodox 
Protestants
Roman 
Catholics 
Jews None 
Hypothesis    M F M F M F M F 
Migration            
Interregional [xii] 1850-1940 rural 33355 (-)  -    (-)  
Urban 1850-
1940 rural 33355 (-)  -    (+)  
Emigration 1850-
1940 rural 33355 (+)  (+)    (+)  
Birth Control            
Childlessness [xiii] 1919-
1950 all 2896 (-)  -  (-)  (+)  
One child family 
[xiv] 
1919-
1950 all 2406 (-)  -  (-)  (+)  
Spacing [xv] 1825-
1885 
West 
Central 2206 -  -  (+)    
Stopping [xvi] 1890-
1940 
West 
Central 1007 -  -  (+)  (+)  
Mortality            
Infant mortality 
[xvii] 
1863-
1909 all 29963 +  (+)  -  (-)  
Child mortality 
[xviii] 
1863-
1914 all 24273 (-)  (+)    (-)  
Old age mortality 
[xix] 
1905-
1940 all 2800 - (-) - (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) 
[xii] Recalculations of dataset presented in Kok, Mandemakers and Mönkediek (2014), heads of 
households in which HSN Research Persons resided, only countryside (Jews excluded because 
of small numbers). 
[xiii] Based on Van Bavel and Kok (2010b). 
[xiv] Based on Van Bavel and Kok (2010c, 217). 
[xv] Based on Van Bavel and Kok (2010a, 134) . N is the number of intervals. See also Van Bavel 
and Kok 2004; 2005. 
[xvi] Kok, Yang and Hsieh2006, 231, model 2 (mothers born 1870-1900). N refers to the num-
ber of births. 
[xvii] Vandezande, Kok,and Mandemakers 2011, 155. 
[xviii] Ibid. 
[xix] Mortality after age 55, N=2758 men and 2872 women. Unpublished lecture, Jan Kok, 
Resources, religion and residence as factors in old-age mortality, The Netherlands 1905-1940 
(2012). 
 
Again, the differences with Liberal Protestants appear to be small, except for 
the greater likelihood of remaining childless and a tendency to stop later with 
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childbearing, but the latter is only tested in specific areas in Western and Cen-
tral Netherlands. In the next section, I will discuss the outcomes of Table 2 in 
more detail. 
5.  Religion and Life Course Domains 
Table 2 suggested strong differences in behavioral outcomes between Orthodox 
Protestants and Catholics on the one hand, and Liberal Protestants, Jews, unaf-
filiated and mixed marrying people (see footnote 1) on the other hand. But why 
do we find in some life domains stronger effects than in others? And can the 
differences that we have found be ascribed to normative prescriptions and 
social control or are they explained by belonging to a religious minority? The 
answer to these questions might differ across life course domains, which is why 
we will take a look at each of these domains in turn.  
5.1  Household 
Not much is known on the role of religious norms in relation to household 
composition and the care for needy kin in historical populations. Family soci-
ology suggests that, in general, religiosity is related to a strong commitment to 
the family and is associated with values encouraging help to family members 
and maintaining strong family relations (Kalmijn and Dykstra 2006; Gans et al. 
2009). Were these values in the past also translated in actual housing behavior? 
In my statistical exercises using reconstructed life courses, I have tried to dis-
cover to what extent people in vulnerable circumstances were living with (ex-
tended) kin. Table 2 shows that some groups of non-believers in vulnerable 
situations (e.g. orphans and adolescent girls) were less likely to be taken in by 
kin. But the outcomes are not statistically significant, which also has to do with 
the low absolute numbers of the unaffiliated in our sample. The interpretation 
of co-residence patterns is also made difficult by the differential availability of 
kin. For instance, celibates or widows from small families are less likely to be 
taken in by siblings than those from large families. Thus, kin co-residence can 
be affected by (religious) differentials in fertility, migration and mortality 
which cannot be accounted for in the models. 
Can we also expect a difference between denominations in their valuation of 
(extended) kin and their likelihood to take in family members in need? Several 
scholars have suggested that Protestantism valued the marital bond, the nuclear 
family, and the individual stronger than Catholicism. The latter apparently 
supported a more “familistic” culture (see overview of the literature in Van 
Poppel and Schoonheim 2005; also Kalmijn and Dykstra 2006). Bahle (2008, 
102) suggests that “…the significance…of individual consciousness [in Protes-
tantism] paved the way for an ‘individualisation’ of family relationships 
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whereas Catholicism kept a group-centered image of the family as an institu-
tion.” Among the Jewish minority, kin relationships may have been cultivated 
more than among other groups (Van Poppel and Schoonheim 2005, 176). A 
study of extended households in an American suburb in the 1960s showed that 
they were most prominent among the Jews, to a lesser extent among Catholics, 
and the least among Protestants (Winch et al. 1967). Differences among 
Protestants might be expected as well. Kooy (1959) speculated that since Or-
thodox Protestant neo-Calvinists (Gereformeerden) strongly advocated the 
autonomy of the couple with respect to the religious upbringing of the children, 
they would be relatively averse to living with non-nuclear family members. 
Our findings suggest that leaving home in adolescence and the destination 
(with kin or not) of those who had left, was not greatly affected by denomina-
tions. Only Jewish boys aged 18 were living with extended kin significantly 
more often than Liberal Protestants. The literature often refers to the geograph-
ically extended network of the Jews (e.g. De Nijs 2005 for Rotterdam), and this 
probably made it possible for boys who had left home for study or work to live 
with relatives. 
In modern studies of Dutch kin relations, Catholics stand out with more fre-
quent contact among family members and stronger norms of mutual obligations 
than others (Komter and Knijn 2006). In the period between about 1860 and 
1940 (see Table 2) they also stand out with a consistent tendency to take in 
relatives who were children of single mothers, or who were orphans, celibates 
or widow(er)s. However, in this respect they did not differ from the Orthodox 
Protestants. To some extent, this was also true for the Jews, but in contrast to 
Liberal Protestants, they did not accept illegitimate children in their homes. All 
in all, these results seem to confirm that (Orthodox) religion was associated 
with closer kin ties and mutual obligations, at least a greater likelihood to take 
in single or needy relatives. One caveat to be mentioned here is the possibility 
that kin co-residence occurred because there were not enough confessional 
institutions (e.g. neo-Calvinist orphanages) available for needy persons belong-
ing to specific religions. 
5.2  Sexuality and Marriage 
In Christian and Jewish religions alike, premarital sexuality was strongly re-
jected. Social control and sanctions might have been especially effective in the 
case of adolescents, who depended on their reputation, their parents and their 
community for support and jobs (Burdette 2007). Doctrinal differences be-
tween Roman Catholics and Protestants can have different outcomes, however. 
Among Catholics the Sacraments were a direct means to grace and salvation, 
and not just a symbol, therefore threats to withhold them might have been more 
effective in their case. Furthermore, enforcing effective discipline on premarital 
behavior was a problem for the Protestant clergy, for several reasons. First, in 
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various parts of the country the betrothal still signalled “marriage” and the 
freedom to have intercourse, as it had before the Council of Trent (1563). Also, 
old traditions of courtship still lingered on. Customs such as “night courting” 
could involve sexuality, but almost always a pregnancy led to marriage as the 
local peer group effectively supervised proceedings. These customs survived 
most of all in relatively isolated, endogamous and socially homogeneous vil-
lages (De Jager 1981). Second, among Liberal Protestants the traditional sanc-
tion in the case of bridal pregnancy – barring the couple from the Eucharist – 
was hardly applied anymore in the first half of the nineteenth century, as it 
tended to drive people away from the mainstream church (Kok 2011). Third, 
strongly Pietist branches of Orthodox Protestantism tended to have low levels 
of effective social control, as I discussed in section 3. One of the most embar-
rassing problems of the Dutch “Bible Belt” was (and still is) the unruly behav-
ior of youths, in particular in the field of premarital sexuality (Kooy and Keuls 
1967). Among the secessionist Orthodox Protestant groups moral discipline 
was revived, e.g. through public shaming of “enforced marrying” couples. 
Dutch historical demography shows strong differences in bridal pregnancy 
ratios between Protestants and Roman Catholics (Engelen 2014), which even 
seemed to have increased in the course of the 19th century. Very low levels 
were found in isolated and predominantly Catholic villages (Kok 1991, 78). 
Clearly, the Catholic clergy in such villages had succeeded in stamping out pre-
Tridentine notions of marriage where their Protestant colleagues had failed. 
Our model (Table 2) confirms that Catholics couples less often expected a child 
before marriage than Protestant ones (controlling for occupational group and 
type of locality), and the same was true for Jewish couples. Orthodox 
Protestant women were even more often pregnant at marriage than Liberal 
Protestant ones. With respect to premarital sexuality, the combination of unam-
biguous prescriptions and effective social control seem to be the most im-
portant factors. 
Churches did not advocate a specific ideal age to marry. But as Orthodox 
Protestants and Roman Catholics adamantly opposed birth control within mar-
riage, traditional marriage restraint remained the only way to limit the size of 
one’s family. Of course, occupational differences and employment opportuni-
ties in rural versus urban areas were of major importance in determining the 
age at marriage, but even if we control for these factors, we find that Orthodox 
Protestants and Roman Catholics had a higher likelihood to marry late, and the 
same was true for Jews (statistically significant only for men). Catholicism 
offered church careers and a safe livelihood for some of its celibate followers. 
The lives of prelates, nuns and monks may have inspired others to abstain from 
marriage too. We have found (Table 2) that Catholics were more likely to re-
main celibate than Liberal Protestants. A positive valuation of celibacy did not 
exist in Protestantism or Judaism, and Orthodox Protestants and Jews did not 
differ significant nor unambiguous from the Liberal Protestants (in both cases, 
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men seemed to have remained less often celibate). Interesting is the positive 
sign for the unaffiliated; possibly there was an association between specific 
socio-cultural environments, atheism and celibacy. For instance, the contempo-
rary sociologist Kohlbrugge wrote in 1928, “The woman [in intellectual cir-
cles] has become so individualistic, that she misses the adaptability necessary 
for marriage” (Kohlbrugge 1928, 4). 
In Roman Catholicism, marriage is a sacrament and therefore indissoluble. 
Remarriage (in church) after a divorce was therefore not possible. For every-
one, however, obtaining a divorce posed formidable legal obstacles and it re-
mained quite rare until the early 1970s. Our model shows that, indeed, Roman 
Catholics had a lower divorce incidence than Liberal Protestants (also in Van 
Poppel 1997), whereas the signs of the Orthodox Protestants are in the same 
direction (but not significant). According to the signs (but, again the outcomes 
are not statistically significant), Jews tended to have relatively frequent divorc-
es. Indeed, obtaining a divorce was not a difficult procedure for them, and, for 
instance, in 19th century eastern Europe they stood out with high divorce rates 
(e.g. Leinarte 2012). Non-affiliated (women) and mixed marrying couples (see 
footnote 1) also seemed to divorce more often. Several factors might explain 
this: persons who are not or less religious than others will not perceive their 
marriage as having been willed by God, and may be less willing to sacrifice 
their personal well-being to keep the marriage intact and they will also be less 
likely to suffer from community sanctions. But some scholars have also pointed 
at the possibility that mixed marrying persons have fewer shared values than 
others, which might make their marriage less “efficient” (Lehrer 2004, 708). 
5.3  Migration 
There are hardly, if any, studies on the autonomous impact of religion on geo-
graphical mobility. We expect that in the period under consideration Roman 
Catholics and Orthodox Protestants were more or less shielded by their church 
leaders from outside, “modern” influences and thus were less open and respon-
sive to information on opportunities elsewhere. Possibly, this led to a lower 
likelihood of interregional and urban migration. To test this, we have done a 
competing-risk event-history analysis of migration of rural households, control-
ling for various household and regional characteristics. In this analysis (Kok et 
al. 2014), we have studied all forms of geographical mobility, including resi-
dential moves within a municipality. But for our purpose here, (relatively) 
long-distance migration (more than 40 kilometres) to another rural location, to 
a city or to another country are the more interesting. The outcomes (see Table 
2) show that Orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics were less likely than 
the Liberal Protestants to migrate to another rural region or to a city, but this 
was only statistically significant in the case of the Roman Catholics. Both 
groups seemed to have been more prone to emigrate (even after controlling for 
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a “border effect,” as especially in the South and South-East catholic villages 
formed the border with Belgium and Germany). 
Apart from factors related to mentality (openness to outside information, 
adversity to city life) we need to consider the effect of forming a religious 
minority. That is why, in the model just described, we controlled for a minority 
effect. We considered Roman Catholics living in municipalities with less than 
20% Roman Catholics a minority, and likewise (Orthodox or Liberal) 
Protestants living in communities with more than 80% Roman Catholics. As 
mentioned above, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the competition 
between religious groups intensified, strengthening their (cultural and social) 
isolation from one another. On the southwestern islands of the province of 
Zeeland, emigration and long distance migration of either Roman Catholics or 
Protestants has been associated with being a local minority (Wintle 1992). This 
impression from Zeeland can be confirmed. Households belonging to Catholic 
or Protestant minorities were much more likely to experience long-distance 
migration to other villages or cities (this was found even stronger in separate 
models in which we only included the minority variable). Their outmigration 
from the countryside can be explained from increasing social isolation, but also 
from their social and kin networks, which may have been more spatially dis-
tributed than the ones of the majority groups. 
Little is known on religious differentials in emigration. A study focusing on 
emigration to America has shown that Roman Catholics were underrepresented 
compared to Protestants (Swierenga and Saueressig-Schreuder 1983), but this 
may have been related to their socio-economic profile, as Protestants were 
more likely to be farmers seeking land. Our models, which controlled for socio-
economic status, showed that Catholics were as or even more likely than 
Protestants to emigrate. In one model in which we did not control for minority 
status, the result that Catholics were more likely to emigrate than Liberal 
Protestants was statistically significant. 
5.4  Birth Control 
Dutch denominations differed strongly in their approach to birth control. From 
the second half of the 19th century, pronatalism became an essential ingredient 
in the Catholic messages to families, from the clergy as well as from the rapid-
ly growing lay organizations. For example, the Brotherhood of the Holy Family 
devoted to improving Catholic morality and family life gained a mass adher-
ence after 1870 (Righart 1988, 203). Also, the Roman Catholic Union for 
Large Families (1918) agitated against the availability of contraceptives. The 
clergy reminded couples that the sole purpose of marriage was procreation and 
that it was sinful to deny each other sexual gratification (the “marital debt”) 
(Flandrin 1970; Schoonheim 2005, 214, 218). This Catholic marital debt notion 
(which also had an equivalent in Judaism) probably increased coital frequency 
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among the members (Schellekens and van Poppel 2006, 240). Protestantism put 
more emphasis on love and compatibility of the spouses, which seems to pre-
clude thinking of sex in terms of rights and duties.  
In Roman Catholicism, confession was a powerful control mechanism to in-
crease compliance. The neo-Calvinists Orthodox Protestants were similarly 
opposed to birth control. Both secessionist Gereformeerde Churches were very 
clear in their doctrinal message: sexuality could only take place within mar-
riage and only with the aim of procreation. This message was conveyed 
through youth organizations, journals and books. For instance, in an Encyclo-
pedia (1925) specifically directed to the Gereformeerde audience, a lengthy 
article was devoted to Neo-Malthusianism. It dismissed economic reasons for 
limiting family size and claimed that, in fact, education of the children was less 
effective in small families. When medical problems made it irresponsible to 
have more children, abstention was proposed as the only solution. The crux of 
the objection against birth control was that by using contraceptive devices one 
“put oneself in God’s place” (Grosheide et al. 1925 IV: 342-4, also in Kok and 
van Bavel 2006). 
Such clear and direct prescriptions cannot always be found. But perhaps 
they are even less important than the differences in indirect norms or mentality 
between religious groups which are sometimes mentioned. According to sever-
al scholars, Jews and Liberal Protestants tended to emphasize individual re-
sponsibility and self-control in the face of problematic situations, for instance 
the need to prevent and cure diseases and to make sure a family is properly 
cared for. Orthodox Protestants and Catholics were supposedly more fatalistic, 
accepting hardships as God’s will (Van Poppel et al. 2012, also Jacobson 
1999). Another factor of importance is schooling. As Protestants were incited 
to read the Bible in their native language for themselves, literacy and schooling 
was valued stronger than among Catholics. This might have made Protestants 
also more susceptible to new, non-religious, “scientific” insights on family 
planning. 
Table 2 displays clear differences in stopping behavior between Orthodox 
Protestants and Roman Catholics on the one hand, and Liberal Protestants on 
the other. Although not statistically significant, Jews and unaffiliated couples 
seem to have been stopping earlier than Liberal Protestants. For stopping be-
havior, this outcome has been corroborated recently by studies using the same 
classification of denominations (Van Poppel et al. 2012; Bras 2014). Van Pop-
pel et al. (2012) showed that Liberal Protestants, Jews and unaffiliated couples 
responded to the survival of their young children by stopping with childbear-
ing, whereas Orthodox Protestants and especially Catholics did not. Bras 
(2014) found particular strong differences in stopping in the late transition 
period, after 1920. To be sure, in Table 2 we have not made a clear distinction 
in pre- and post-transition periods, whereas in most studies religious differen-
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tials before the fertility transition were found to be weak, if at all (Schellekens 
and Van Poppel 2006). 
Stopping has often been considered a more “modern” form of birth control, 
whereas spacing could be achieved with traditional methods such as abstention 
and prolonged breast feeding. Thus, spacing could have been a more acceptable 
form of birth control in the more traditional churches (Anderton and Bean 
1985; Junkka and Edvinsson 2016). Table 2, however, shows that Orthodox 
Protestants, just as the Catholics, were much less inclined than Liberal 
Protestants to space their births. 
Catholics couples were significantly less often childless than Liberal 
Protestants, after controlling for obvious variables such as age at marriage, 
occupation and place of residence. An American study has shown that also in 
contemporary society Catholics object more often to voluntary childlessness 
than others (Pearce 2002). Interestingly, mixed marriages were even more often 
childless than Liberal Protestant marriages (see footnote 1), which suggest that 
religiosity does have an effect on this form of fertility behaviour, which was 
not found in a recent study by Baudin (2015, 414). The Jews did not have very 
small families, as they did in several other countries, which is generally as-
cribed to their higher (opportunity) costs of having children, due to their valua-
tion of schooling for girls (Lehrer 2004). But our outcomes seem to confirm the 
impression of Schellekens and Van Poppel (2006) that, at least in their study of 
The Hague, the Jews were not forerunners in the fertility transition. 
5.5  Mortality 
Historical demography, in The Netherlands and elsewhere, suggest two major 
differences in infant and child mortality rates by religion: the first between 
Jews and Gentiles, and the second between Roman Catholics and Protestants. 
In many historical populations, Jewish infants had better chances of survival 
than others. Several direct religious prescriptions and more indirect life style 
effects were responsible for this favorable situation. First, the rules for personal 
hygiene (e.g. nail cutting, frequent hand washing, ritual baths) probably result-
ed in fewer infections of children through their parents. Second, dietary laws 
(such as the separation of milk and meat) protected children from contaminated 
food. Third, Jewish mothers tended to breastfeed their children longer than 
others, sometimes acting on rabbinical advice (Schellekens and van Poppel 
2006, 24). Fourth, Jews were noted for their careful housecleaning. Fifth, they 
were more inclined than other groups to seek help from medical experts (Dero-
sas 2003, 112). Sixth, there appear to have been many specialized Jewish wel-
fare institutions which were effective in helping poor mothers (Derosas 2003, 
113). And, finally, the fact that they were isolated from other groups may have 
protected the Jews from infectious diseases (Van Poppel, Schellekens and 
Liefbroer 2002). Differential mortality of Catholic versus Protestant children is 
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expected for two reasons. First, there is the already mentioned Catholic fatal-
ism which stands in contrast to Protestant emphasis on personal responsibility. 
Van Poppel et al. (2012) quote the influential Catholic writer Truyen, who 
wrote in 1918 that Catholic women “being adverse to neo-Malthusianism, 
accepted the burden and the risks of motherhood rather than being unfaithful to 
her natural and religious obligations (…)” (p. 327). Second, Catholic mothers 
were supposedly less inclined to breastfeed their children, in response to an 
early 20th century campaign of the priests to remove all erotic seductions from 
public life, such as exposing breasts to feed an infant (Van Poppel 1992; Wal-
hout 2010; Janssens 2014). 
Our findings confirm that infant mortality among Jews was significantly 
lower than in all other groups. However, the Roman Catholics did not have 
(statistically) significant higher mortality than the Liberal Protestants. The 
latter is in line with recent research in which Roman Catholicism is exculpated 
from high infant mortality (Janssens et al. 2010; Walhout 2010; Van den 
Boomen 2015). Recently, Janssens and Pelzer (2014) concluded that “region” 
trumps religion, as in their analysis of infant mortality regional differences 
turned out to be stronger than denominational ones. They suggest that women 
from different Churches shared the same, local, habits of infant care, including 
breastfeeding. It will be of interest to test this hypothesis in more detailed reli-
gion-region interactions. However, we do see that Orthodox Protestants, which 
were certainly not all confined to specific regions, had higher levels of infant 
mortality than the Liberal Protestants. Perhaps certain characteristics of Ortho-
doxy, such as fatalism and adversity to modern science, did play a role. Also, 
the outcomes refutes the idea that growing up in a (religious) minority protect-
ed young children. As for child mortality, we did not find statistically signifi-
cant differences, but the Jews still seem to do well. Orthodox Protestant chil-
dren seem to have done better than Liberal Protestant ones. 
Finally, we have looked at old age mortality, defined as the mortality risks 
of people older than 55. In studies on the effect of religion on old age mortality, 
specific prescriptions hardly play a role. Religiosity is supposed to be more 
important than belonging to a specific denomination. Religious practice has 
regularly been associated with lower levels of depression; apparently religious 
participation helps to cope with adversity in later life (Braam et al. 2001; Lee 
and Newberg 2005). Church attendance is associated with higher survival rates, 
which seems to work through higher frequency of contacts and greater likeli-
hood to receive help (Sullivan 2010; La Cour et al. 2006). To some extent 
denominational differences can be expected: fundamentalist religions tend to 
emphasize moderation with smoking and drinking more than other religions. 
Also, the tight communities found in secessionist groups form more effective 
environments for social control (O’Reilly and Rosato 2008). Our findings 
confirm the hypothesis that denominations with a higher level of religious 
involvement – in the period under consideration many branches of Orthodox 
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Protestantism and Roman Catholicism – were associated with higher survival 
chances of elderly members. However, the outcomes for the nonaffiliated seem 
to contradict this (but they are not statistically significant). Interestingly, the 
significant positive findings for Orthodox Protestant and Catholics were only 
found among men, which contradicts the conclusion in other studies that 
churchgoing is much healthier for women than for men (La Cour et al. 2006). 
Also, Jewish women were not doing better than Liberal Protestant ones, which 
puts in perspective the notion that religious prescriptions on personal hygiene 
and food preparations has a salutary effect.  
Overall, our outcomes on mortality are mixed. Orthodox Protestant infants 
had lower chances of survival, which seems to point at the effect of fatalism 
and aversion to ‘outside’ advice. The opposite was found for the Jews. In old 
age, belonging to more Orthodox Churches had a positive effect on survival, 
probably through a stronger involvement in social networks. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In four ways, this paper contributes to the debate on the question how religion 
impacts on demographic behaviour. First, it proposes a classification to deal 
with the myriad of Protestant groups. In many studies, Protestants have been 
lumped together, ignoring their strong dogmatic differences (Levin and Schiller 
1987, 13). Moreover, these intra-Protestant differences extend to internal 
mechanisms of communication and systems of social control as well. On the 
basis of religious norms and mechanisms of ensuring compliance, a distinction 
between Liberal and Orthodox Protestants was made. Second, the paper moves 
beyond the local and regional scope of most studies of religious differentials by 
using a nationwide sample with reconstructed life courses. As most religious 
groups were spread across the country, this approach allows us to control for 
factors such as type of residence. Of course, the downside of this approach is 
that we cannot study how religious communities interacted with their local 
environment, perhaps resulting in a reinforcement or weakening of effects that 
we have found at the national level. In addition, the database allows us to con-
trol for many factors, foremost the socio-economic characteristics that have 
been found to explain religious differentials in behaviour. Third, we go beyond 
the usual focus on sexuality and birth control by looking at a large number of 
life course transitions, ranging from infant mortality to kin co-residence at old 
age. The question is whether a consistent pattern of denominational differen-
tials appears when we compare all those transitions. Finally, the paper seeks to 
explain those differentials, by evaluating the usual explanations given in the 
literature. Thus, for each life course domain, we discuss the role of specific 
religious norms and prescriptions, the role of mechanisms of communication 
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and control, the role of life style and mentality, and the role of belonging to a 
minority and its networks.  
In the period we have studied, Dutch society was characterized by a strong 
competition between ideological groups. The struggle was mainly concerned 
with the claim of different groups to be relatively autonomous versus the state. 
The differences of opinion did not extend to views on sexuality, morality or 
family. On the contrary, all parties aspired to moral respectability, in order be 
considered a worthy opponent. All, including the Socialists, emphasized their 
adherence to traditional family ideals, which, among others, led to the rejection 
of propaganda for modern birth control (1911). Thus, during this era of ‘pillari-
zation’, the Dutch came to be known as the “moral nation” (Kok 1990). Given 
this general conformity to traditional (bourgeois) family ideals, it is unlikely 
that large differences in moral prescriptions existed between the different de-
nominations, or between them and the non-affiliated. Therefore, it is even more 
remarkable that we have found such strong and consistent differences in behav-
iour, especially between the Roman Catholics and the Liberal Protestants. The 
results make clear that – even though we do not know the level of individual 
religiosity – religious affiliation is an important factor to be included in (histor-
ical) demographic analysis. To be sure, this analysis, which takes the long 
period 1850-1970 as a whole (thus ignoring changes within this period) does 
not allow to see whether religious differentials had been weaker before pillari-
zation, and how they changed after 1970. 
But why does denomination matter? As said, there were no strong differ-
ences in opinion between the Churches on morality: premarital sexuality, vol-
untary childlessness, divorce were more or less rejected by all, including by 
non-believers. Of course, some differences in moral prescriptions existed, 
which probably affected behaviour. Examples are the Catholic rejection of 
divorce which is reflected in lower divorce rates and their notion of the “mari-
tal debt” which probably increased coital frequency and shortened birth inter-
vals. We can also mention Jewish regulations on food preparation and personal 
hygiene, which lowered infant mortality risks. Probably more important than 
(differences between) religious norms were the churches’ means of communi-
cation, control and sanctions. The Liberal Protestants emphasized individual 
responsibility in family matters, and they had more or less abandoned tradition-
al moral discipline. Secessionist Protestant groups as well as the Roman Catho-
lics, on the other hand, were as effective in communicating moral messages as 
in disciplining the flock. They could do so because their adherents strongly 
identified with their church leaders, and did do well into the second half of the 
twentieth century. Social control did not only come from the clergy, the church 
elders and the deacons in charge of poor relief, but also from the members one 
regularly met. Tight communities could restrain people from deviant (e.g. 
premarital sexuality) or unhealthy behaviour. Effective control and mutual help 
resulted in mortality differentials at old age. 
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Apart from direct prescriptions and the effects of social control, the more 
indirect influence of mentality has come to the fore. It is difficult to prove how 
denominations differed exactly in terms of “familism” and “fatalism,” but the 
behavioural outcomes are suggestive. Roman Catholics and Orthodox 
Protestants seem to have been more likely to accept needy kin in their homes. 
And their rejection of birth control (apart from late marriage) suggest they were 
resigned to accept children as gifts from God. Rural Catholics were more ad-
verse to move away from their region than Liberal Protestants. 
Finally, belonging to a religious minority may have had effects on its own. 
For one thing, it may have led to the formation of more expanded kin networks 
than in majority groups. This could be an explanation for the kin co-residence 
patterns we have found as well as for the greater likelihood of both Protestant 
and Catholic minorities to move away from the region in which they lived. We 
have not found that living in isolated minorities as such protected people from 
infectious diseases. 
Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms that may have led to behavioural dif-
ferences by denomination in each life course domain. It is clear that a single 
causal mechanism cannot be identified, and that we have to combine different 
explanations. Future research, for instance using a multilevel design, will need 
to clarify the role of environment effects (e.g. the local presence of specific 
confessional institutions for vulnerable persons, or the presence of doctors, 
which may be caused by the regional distribution of religions). 
Table 2: Overview of Mechanisms explaining Religious Differentials, by Life 
Course Domain 
 Co-residence Sexuality and marriage Migration Birth control Mortality 
Direct 
prescriptions  x  x x 
Indirect norms x  x x x 
Social control  x  x x 
Sociability     x 
Minority networks x  x   
Environment 
effects ?    ? 
 
The overview of religious differentials across the life course allows us to an-
swer one final question. Are the differences between denominations so con-
sistent that we can speak of specific idealized life courses or “life scripts”? The 
answer is no. Of course, one could say that the Liberal Protestants (and the 
non-affiliated, to some extent the Jews, and the mixed marrying couples) fol-
lowed an “individual responsibility script” whereas we could discern a “devout 
Christian script” among the Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestants. But it 
is more likely that the behavioural patterns we have found resulted from differ-
ences in identification with the clergy, differences in churches’ social control 
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and communication, and differences in group cultures (mentalities) than from 
denominationally specific norms on how to lead one’s life. 
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Appendix 
Classification of Dutch Protestant Religious Denominations (1850-1940) 
Liberal Protestant 
Nederlands (or Nederduitsch) Hervormd, in case in one’s place of birth not all 
church ministers (in 1920) belonged to an organization for Orthodox Liberal 
Dutch Reformed, either the Confessionele Vereniging or the Gereformeerde 
Bond tot Verbreiding van de Waarheid in de Nederlandsche Hervormde 
(Gereformeerde) Kerk, Knippenberg 2003, p.109-110 and CD-ROM with 
Historical database of Dutch Municipalities. 
Waals Hervormd 
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Doopsgezind or Mennoniet 
Remonstrants 
Evangelisch Luthers  
Hersteld Evangelisch Luthers  
OrthodoxProtestant 
Nederlands (or Nederduitsch) Hervormd, in case in one’s place of birth all 
church ministers (in 1920) belonged to an organization for Orthodox Liberal 
Dutch Reformed, either the Confessionele Vereniging or the Gereformeerde 
Bond tot Verbreiding van de Waarheid in de Nederlandsche Hervormde (Gere-
formeerde) Kerk, Knippenberg 2003, p.109-110 and CD-ROM with Historical 
database of Dutch Municipalities. 
Christelijk Gereformeerd 
Gereformeerd (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland) 
Christelijk Afgescheiden Gemeente 
Christelijk Gereformeerd 
Gereformeerde Kerken onder het Kruis 
Gereformeerde Gemeenten (onder het Kruis) 
Oud-Gereformeerd 
Nederlands Gereformeerd 
Baptist 
Apostolisch Genootschap 
Hersteld Apostolische Zendingsgemeenschap in de Eenheid der Apostelen 
Leger des Heils 
Pinkstergemeente 
Not classified 
Oudkatholiek (also Oud Bisschoppelijk or Oud Rooms) 
Anglicaans 
